In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when …rms should preserve "equity capacity" through choosing high target leverage or "debt capacity" through choosing low target leverage. Thereby, …rms reduce a problem of underinvestment or overinvestment when they must raise future …nancing under asymmetric information. Which problem arises depends on whether additional …nancing is raised at competitive terms or whether there is a lock-in with initial investors. Firms'initial (or target) capital structure matters as it a¤ects the "outside option" of both insiders and outside investors. Our theory also entails implications for start-up and venture capital …nancing.
Introduction
Successful …rms rarely raise …nancing only once in their liftetime. The key contribution of this paper is to recognize that when they intend to raise fresh …nancing, …rms'existing capital structure shapes the "outside options" of both inside owners and outside investors, i.e., the payo¤s that they can expect when no new …nancing is raised. This link through the respective "outside options" ensures that a young …rm's initial capital structure or the target capital structure of a mature …rm matter when the …rm must raise additional …nancing, possibly at short notice, under asymmetric information.
While the notion that …rms'…nancial structure is shaped by problems of asymmetric information has a long-standing tradition in the theory of corporate …nance (Myers and Majluf, 1984) , our novel contribution is to embed the most standard problem of asymmetric information into a simple, two-period dynamic model and, thereby, obtain a rich set of implications from a single agency problem. We show when the "pecking order" theory should hold or when it should fail to hold, and we show when …rms should optimally preserve "debt capacity" and when they should rather preserve "equity capacity" in order to improve e¢ ciency.
Firms that expect to be locked-in with investors who exert substantial bargaining power at later …nancing rounds bene…t from initially preserving equity capacity so as to reduce an underinvestment problem in the future. This allows to make it more attractive for investors to …nance future growth. Instead, …rms that expect to receive future …nancing at competitive terms are better o¤ preserving debt capacity so as to reduce an overinvestment problem in the future. In this case, debt is used to reassure investors that only su¢ ciently pro…table opportunities are …nanced.
Our results speak to the question how …rms should choose a target capital structure, from which they then deviate when …nancing is raised (at short notice) under asymmetric information. By taking our two-period model more literally, we also relate our results to the literature on venture capital and small-…rm …nancing. We derive conditions for when …rms optimally have low leverage initially, but subsequently increase leverage as they raise additional …nancing. We interpret our results also in terms of the use of convertible securities. As we obtain quite di¤erent predictions for the optimal choice of leverage and its change over time, depending on whether there is an over-or an underinvestment problem, our results help to organize the somewhat contradicting recent evidence. For instance, we con…rm the "pecking order" when additional capital can be raised at competitive terms.
If, instead, re…nancing conditions are determined by a relationship investor with strong bargaining power, we predict that leverage decreases when new …nancing must be raised under asymmetric information.
The case in which …rms can always raise (additional) …nancing at competitive terms is most closely related to the extant theoretical literature. Then, re…nancing under asymmetric information will increase leverage, which con…rms the predictions of the "pecking order" (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Nachman and Noe, 1994) . Debt …nancing limits overinvestment. In fact, in our dynamic model, where the …rm has an endogenously chosen initial capital structure in place, we show that debt …nancing may even ensure that investment is …rst-best e¢ cient. The …rm's optimal initial (or target) …nancial structure maximally preserves the …rm's "debt capacity". This increases e¢ ciency when future …nancing is needed. Firms with growth opportunities and access to competitive …nancing should thus have a low target leverage ratio and they should temporarily increase leverage when fresh outside funding is needed. These predictions are overturned when …rms are "locked-in" with existing (relationship) investors, at least when future …nancing has to be raised under asymmetric information, e.g., at short notice. With a strong investor, re…nancing leads to a reduction, rather than to an increase in leverage.
These richer predictions of our model are in line with recent evidence that does not universally support the pecking order (Fama and French, 2005; Leary and Roberts, 2010) .
One reason why incumbent investors may have bargaining power, which is when the pecking order fails, is that their refusal to (co-)…nance new investment may make it impossible for the …rm to raise new …nancing elsewhere. Such a refusal sends a negative signal about the …rm's overall prospects ("lemons") . For this case, we show that underinvestment can result as investors seek to extract a larger share of the gains from a new investment. There is less underinvestment if re…nancing leads to a decrease in the …rm's leverage. The optimal initial capital structure should exhibit high leverage, as it preserves the …rm's "equity capacity" and, thereby, mitigates the risk of future underinvestment.
We extend the most simple model of security design under asymmetric information in a natural way, namely by making also the initial capital structure endogenous. When we interpret the (initial) capital structure under symmetric information as …rms' long-term choice, we obtain predictions both for …rms'target capital structure and for the direction of deviations. The key distinction is whether …rms can raise …nancing competitively even under asymmetric information, as this determines whether there will be a problem of overinvestment or underinvestment. The initial (or target) capital structure a¤ects e¢ ciency as it shapes the "outside options" of both insiders and initial outside investors. In terms of predictions, we argue that (large) …rms that can raise capital at competitive terms also under asymmetric information will do so by issuing debt, though their target capital structure involves little debt, but small …rms facing a specialized or relationship investor will issue equity when they need additional …nancing, though their target capital structure involves high leverage. These predictions are in line with …ndings by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) or Frank and Goyal (2003) . It has also been documented that equity is often raised by …rms that are not under duress (Fama and French, 2005) , possibly so as to thereby stock-pile debt capacity (Lemmon and Zender, 2009 ). In contrast, smaller growth …rms have been shown to issue debt when asymmetric information is not a factor, so as to preserve equity capacity for the long run (Leary and Roberts, 2010; Gomes and Phillips, 2005) . We discuss below in more detail our implications and how they compare to existing …ndings.
Our di¤erent results, depending on whether there is a problem of under-or overinvestment when …nancing must be raised under asymmetric information, also help to organize some recent con ‡icting evidence on start-up and young …rm …nancing. For this interpretation we take our two-stage model of …nancing more literally. The optimal choice of securities over time then depends crucially on outside investor versus owner-manager bargaining power.
1 Such a di¤erence in bargaining power may, for instance, arise from di¤erences in the legal environment (e.g., Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming 2005 Cumming , 2008 Kaplan et al., 2007) . We show that if bargaining power is in the hands of the owner-manager at the re…nancing stage, then it is optimal to initially …nance with junior securities and to switch to more senior securities at later stages. In accordance with this prediction, the above studies …nd that in countries with weak creditor rights or weak enforcement of these rights equity is more frequently issued in …rst rounds and for younger companies. More successful …rms then issue more senior securities in later rounds of …nancing (in particular, Kaplan et al., 2007) . In contrast, if …rms face a strong investor, our results prescribe the opposite behavior, and …rms should then initially raise …nance through issuing senior claims. In line with this result, start-up …rms in countries with a strong protection of creditor rights and strong law enforcement issue securities that initially give the investor downside protection, but which may be converted to more junior claims with a higher upside participation during expansion in later …nancing rounds (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) .
In terms of corporate …nance theory, a novel contribution of our model is to solve for a security design problem under asymmetric information where both the privately informed owner-manager and the original investors already have a stake in the company. Their existing claims create "outside options", whose value depends on the …rm's pro…tability when no new …nancing is raised. Technically, we thus solve for a game of screening (when the investor has bargaining power) and a game of signaling (when the owner-manager has bargaining power) with so-called type-dependent reservation values.
2 By a¤ecting the "outside options" at the re…nancing stage, the …rm's initial …nancing structure becomes relevant even though it is chosen under symmetric information. We obtain conditions when despite private information at the re…nancing stage, the outcome is e¢ cient, i.e., there is no under-or overinvestment. This is made possible as also the value of the stakeholders' "outside options" depends on the …rm's pro…tability. Since in practice (fresh) …nancing is frequently raised when the …rm already has outstanding securities, our two-period model of …nancing under asymmetric information should add realism.
3
There is a growing body of research on the dynamics of a …rm's optimal capital structure, trading o¤ tax bene…ts, bankruptcy and agency costs, or the occurrence of technology shocks, for instance, (cf., Hennesy and Whited, 2005; Miao, 2005) . In contrast to this literature, we derive our results from a single ine¢ ciency, namely interim private information, in a stylized two-period setting. In a related paper, Axelson et al. (2009) also take a security design approach in a model with interim private information. Similarly to our case of a "weak" investor at the re…nancing stage, they derive debt as the unique interim security. This con…rms the predictions of Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order theory (cf., also Nachman and Noe, 1994 ). In our model, however, (re)…nancing is not always optimal for the owner-manager, as the existing capital structure serves as an outside option. The overinvestment problem is then less severe. In fact, as we noted above, …rst-best investment may be achieved, and the pecking order is reversed if the bargaining power shifts to the uninformed investor. 4 Though DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and Biais and Mariotti (2005) also consider a two-stage game, the security in their models is designed before private information is revealed, and ultimately only a single security is issued.
The separation of initial …nancing and possible re…nancing relates our paper also to the literature on stage …nancing, which is a well documented fact in start-up …nance (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) . A number of authors have used staging in a security design context when there is no commitment to re…nancing (e.g., Cornelli and Yosha, 2003) . Further, following Aghion and Bolton (1992) , several papers have motivated the use of contingent securities in venture capital …nancing in the context of incomplete contracting (e.g., Berglöf, 1994) . We add to this literature by obtaining unique and contrasting optimal securities from an interim adverse selection problem. Our contribution lies especially in showing how variations in bargaining power, as arising from di¤erent legal environments or di¤erent stages of …rm development, signi…cantly change optimal security design.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 examines the optimal initial and interim …nancing when the investor has bargaining power at the re…nancing stage. Section 4 characterizes security design when the ownermanager has bargaining power at the interim stage. Empirical implications of our results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
We envisage a …rm that raises …nancing in an initial period, t = 1, and that raises additional …nancing in a subsequent period, t = 2. Precisely, suppose that at t = 1 a penniless ownermanager ("she") needs to raise initial …nancing K 1 > 0. At t = 2, another investment K 2 > 0 can be made. We argue below why it is not possible to raise all …nancing initially.
For simplicity only, we assume that the investment opportunity in t = 2 arises with probability one. The investment opportunity will be pro…table only sometimes, though.
Cash ‡ows are realized in the …nal period, t = 3. Both the owner-manager and investors are risk neutral, and we abstract from discounting. We next add more details to our model.
Financing and Contracting
The …rm's veri…able cash ‡ow at t = 3 is either low or high: x l 0 or x h > x l . The likelihood of realizing high cash ‡ow depends both on whether additional capital was injected at t = 2 and on the …rm's underlying pro…tability (its "type"). This is made precise when discussing the information structure below. Our restriction to only two cash ‡ows is only for convenience, as results can be generalized to a setting with a continuous cash- ‡ow distribution (cf. on the respective generalization of assumptions footnote 6 below).
To raise K 1 at t = 1, the owner-manager issues a security R 1 (x) that conditions the repayment on the …nal cash ‡ow. The …rm can initially raise capital competitively, so that the resulting security design problem will be to maximize the ex-ante value of the owner-manager's claims. For this reason, we stipulate that at t = 1 the owner-manager can o¤er R 1 (x) to investors.
Raising …nancing at t = 2, provided this is successful, involves a fresh injection of K 2 by the investor. Then, the initial security R 1 (x) that is held by outside investors is replaced by a new security R 2 (x). Here, it is convenient to suppose that all outside claims are held by one investor. However, as we argue below our results are applicable more broadly, so that there could be, for instance, fresh …nancing from new investors. But we also discuss applications where it is reasonable that there is a single investor, e.g., a housebank or a venture capital investor. We also discuss below how our two stages, t = 1 and t = 2, can be interpreted as representing a …rm's long-term and short-term choice of …nancing and leverage.
We make the standard assumptions that 0 R t (x) x and that both R t (x) and x R t (x) are nondecreasing. According to the …rst assumption, the security can only distribute the cash ‡ows that are realized by the …rm. As the owner-manager is assumed to be penniless, the relevant restriction is that R t (x) 0: The security can not specify a "wage" that is paid to the owner-manager over and above the …rm's cash ‡ow. This assumption is common in the literature. Such a payment could lure "non-serious" operators into the market. Also, it is common to assume that both R t (x) and x R t (x), i.e., the payouts to outside investors and the owner-manager, are nondecreasing. Otherwise, either party could have an incentive to "destroy" cash ‡ow by obstructing the operations of the …rm.
Information The …rm's pro…tability can take on two values. We refer to these as a good or bad "state", = fB; Gg. A priori, the likelihood of = G is given by 0 < b q < 1.
At t = 1, this is common knowledge between the owner-manager and potential investors.
At t = 2, when the re…nancing decision must be made, the owner-manager has already gained an informational advantage regarding , which she cannot credibly share with the investor, at least not at such short notice. Based on this private information, the posterior belief of the owner-manager regarding Pr ( = G) is q. We refer to the owner-manager's private information q as her "type" at t = 2. It is a priori distributed according to some
Together with the decision whether to re…nance at t = 2, d 2 D := fY; N g ("Yes" and "No"), the …rm's pro…tability = fB; Gg determines the probability of high cash ‡ows:
Assuming that p dG > p dB holds for all d 2 D, = G can be unambiguously referred to as the "good" sate irrespective of whether re…nancing was obtained or not. Further, re…nancing has a larger impact on the …rm's upside potential if the …rm's pro…tability is = G rather than = B, i.e., if the …rm's prospects are generally more attractive:
We discuss the importance of condition (1) for our characterization of unique optimal securities below. Note that it implies that
6 5 Alternatively, we may, instead, stipulate that the owner-manager privately observes some signal #, which is generated by the CDFs (#). We can then generate q as well as F (q) by using Bayes'rule. 6 As noted above, our results can be generalized to a setting with a continuous cash- ‡ow distribution. Formally, with a CDF H d (xj ) for all combinations d = fY; N g and = fG; Bg we can …rst generalize p d (x) := 1 H d (xj ). Assume that the distribution for G dominates that for B in terms of conditional stochastic dominance (CSD): p dG (x 0 jz) p dB (x 0 jz) for x 0 ; z 2 X, where p d (xjz) is the conditional probability 1 Pr (x 0 x x 0 + z). This implies that high cash ‡ows are increasingly more probably in state G compared to state B:
0. Further, to generalize condition (1), we would require that
p N B (x) holds for all x. We have shown in a working-paper version how these assumptions jointly ensure that all our subsequent results on optimal security design extend to a setting with a continuous cash- ‡ow distribution.
Discussion of Contracting For our analysis, we distinguish two cases for the game that proceeds at the re…nancing stage t = 2. We capture the case where the …rm is "locked-in" with the initial investor by granting the investor all bargaining power: It is the investor who makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. When there is no such "lock-in", the owner-manager has all bargaining power. Then, it is the owner-manager who makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
While these two settings are certainly extreme, they allow to capture the fundamental sources of ine¢ ciency that arise from asymmetric information.
After deriving our …rst characterization, we will be more explicit about endogenizing a possible "lock-in", e.g., through an additional layer of information asymmetry between initial investors and new investors at t = 2. Then, we will also motivate our assumption that not all of the required funds, K 1 + K 2 , are raised initially and that we can indeed restrict attention to a sequence of simple contractual games: raising initial …nancing in t = 1 through R 1 (x) and re…nancing in t = 2 through an exchange for R 2 (x).
Additional Notation and Parameter Restriction
To ease exposition, we use the following short-hand notation: R t l := R t (x l ) denotes the repayment for low cash ‡ow,
denotes the outside investor's upside, and x := x h x l denotes the upside of the whole …rm. One can then represent the investor's payo¤ when there is
depending on the re…nancing security contract R 2 and the owner-manager's private information (his "type") q. Note that the payo¤ is gross of the initial outlay K 1 , but net of K 2 . Likewise, denote the investor's expected payo¤ without re…nancing by
Total expected cash ‡ow in either case is given by the joint surplus
With this at hands, the owner-manager's expected payo¤ can be written as
To limit trivial case distinctions, we suppose that re…nancing is e¢ cient only in = G:
This implies that there exists a cuto¤ 0 < q F B < 1, so that re…nancing increases the joint surplus only if the owner-manager's type (the probability of being in G) is above q F B .
Similarly, it is convenient to stipulate that
as this allows to rule out the use of safe debt. Throughout the analysis we assume that the …rm is …nancially viable at t = 1 under the respective optimal contracts. 3 The Case with a Strong Investor
We proceed backwards and take …rst the re…nancing stage at t = 2. The equilibrium outcome is then plugged into the problem that arises at the initial …nancing stage, t = 1.
Recall that we presently consider a game where the investor can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the owner-manager at t = 2. Hence, while initially the …rm faces a competitive market for capital, the initial investor has bargaining power vis-à-vis the (locked-in) …rm when it needs re…nancing at t = 2.
Re…nancing (Strong Investor)
To obtain re…nancing K 2 , the owner-manager must agree to replace the existing security R 1 by R 2 , as proposed by the investor. Otherwise, no new capital K 2 is injected and the original security R 1 stays in place.
Denote the set of all types q who accept the o¤er by q 2
The investor's objective is thus to choose R 2 so as to maximize (3), subject to the imposed "feasibility" constraints for R 2 : 0 R 2 (x) x and that both R 2 (x) and x R 2 (x) are non-decreasing. This program is solved next.
7 After deriving the optimal contracts, a condition that is both necessary and su¢ cient can be obtained, albeit only implicitly in terms of the primitives. 8 Resolving the owner-manager's indi¤erence in this way will be inconsequential for the further analysis.
Optimal Re…nancing Security Arguably, the best that the investor can do is to ensure that the e¢ cient decision is made while extracting the full surplus from re…nancing. We show that this may be feasible even though the owner-manager has private information about the bene…ts from re…nancing. This requires that each owner-manager type q 2 A is exactly indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the investor's o¤er:
so that for the incremental payo¤ of the investor it indeed holds that
Note that this is just a formal restatement of the requirement that the investor extracts the whole NPV from the new investment. Note that for the owner-manager it is from (4) indeed optimal to choose the acceptance set A = [q F B ; 1]. Resolving his indi¤erence (for all q) in this way is, however, not an assumption: It clearly must apply in equilibrium, provided that such a contract R 2 is feasible, as otherwise the investor could marginally adjust the contract to break the manager's indi¤erence to the left and the right of q = q F B .
We now construct the respective security so that (4) is satis…ed, which we denote by
As it implements the …rst-best acceptance decision, we also refer to it as the "…rst-best" security, though it should be recalled that it also allows the investor to extract all incremental surplus from re…nancing. For any initial security R 1 , one can solve (4) to obtain the "upside" b R and the respective safe repayment, b R l :
We …rst comment on the properties of this contract before discussing when it is feasible.
The characterization in (5), together with condition (1), imply that b R > R 1 , while from (6) it then follows that b R l < R 1 l . Hence, the "…rst-best" security b R o¤ered in t = 2 is unambiguously steeper from the investor's perspective than the initial security R 1 . The intuition is immediate. Recall that re…nancing has a larger impact on expected cash ‡ows when the …rm is more pro…table, = G, compared to when = B (cf. condition (1)). To keep all types q indi¤erent between the old security and the new security with additional …nancing, as required by (4), the owner-manager must receive less from the upside and more from the safe cash ‡ow under security R 2 , compared to the initial security R 1 . Only then will she be indi¤erent between re…nancing and non-re…nancing for all q. Consequently, the claims held by the outside investor, R 2 = b R, are strictly steeper than under the initial security R 1 .
The "…rst-best" security, b R, may not be feasible, though. This is the case when the new security can not be made su¢ ciently steep, as b R would require that b R l < 0, which is not feasible. That is, in order to indeed extract the full surplus from the new investment, the investor would have to demand a security with a "negative repayment" b R l < 0.
9 The optimal feasible security will then be ‡atter than b R, and not all of the surplus from re…nancing can be extracted by the investor. That is, the di¤erence in the owner-manager's expected payo¤ with and without re…nancing, u Y (R 2 ; q) u N (R 1 ; q), is no longer zero everywhere, as it is when R 2 = b R, but it is strictly increasing in q. For this case, denote the unique point of intersection of u Y (R 2 ; q) and u N (R 1 ; q) by q :
The set of owner-manager types who accept the re…nancing o¤er in t = 2 becomes thus
The owner-manager prefers to accept R 2 ifand strictly so if q > q , while she prefers to reject the new o¤er if q < q . All types q > q now receive an information rent of size
For each type q > q , we can say that the rent (8) is a payo¤ that the investor loses, as he presently can exert his bargaining power when proposing the security R 2 .
Consequently, the investor wants to make the expected rent as small as possible. Note that for each q > q , the rent (8) is arguably smaller when the owner-manager's expected payo¤ under re…nancing becomes ‡atter. To make u Y (R 2 ; q) ‡atter, i.e., to decrease the slope everywhere, the owner-manager's residual claim x R 2 (x) must become ‡atter, which in turn requires that the investor's claim R 2 becomes steeper. Hence, if b R is not feasible, the best the investor can do is to make the new security R 2 as steep as possible, through 9 As noted above, this could prescribe a wage that is paid to the owner-manager regardless of the …rm's performance, which -following standard restrictions -we excluded.
10 While we could simply set q = 0 for the case where there is no intersection as also u Y R 2 ; q = 0 > u N R 1 ; q = 0 , this case will not arise by optimality for the investor. In fact, we show that alwaysF B .
maximizing R 2 , while ensuring that R 2 remains feasible.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there is a strong investor, who makes the o¤er at the re…-nancing stage. Then, when re…nancing is successful, the investor holds a security R 2 that is steeper than the initial security
We further have the following case distinction:
holds, then the "…rst-best" security R 2 = b R, as characterized in (5)- (6), is feasible and uniquely optimal, in which case the re…nancing decision is always e¢ cient: There is re…-nancing if and only if= q F B .
(ii) Otherwise, i.e., if (9) does not hold, the new security is levered equity with R 2 l = 0; and there is re…nancing if and only if. There is underinvestment as q F B < q < 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
We postpone the discussion of condition (9), as we presently take the initial security R 1 as given. Hence, we return to this condition once we have solved also for the optimal initial security R 1 . If condition (9) does not hold, Proposition 1 pins down levered equity with R 2 l = 0 as the uniquely optimal shape of the optimal security at the re…nancing stage. This maximally shifts the claim of the owner-manager to the low cash- ‡ow realization and that of the investor to the high cash- ‡ow realization. By thereby making the investor's payo¤ from re…nancing as steep as possible and that of the owner-manager as ‡at as possible, the owner-manager's information rent is minimized. Note that we presently take a general security design perspective and thus consider the full replacement of the initial security R 1 by a new security R 2 . After deriving the optimal initial security R 1 in the following section, we o¤er more interpretation for Proposition 1, e.g., in terms of a change in leverage or in terms of converting an existing security.
Rephrasing the Investor' s Trade-O¤ If b R is not feasible (cf. case ii) in Proposition 1), the investor faces a trade-o¤ between maximizing surplus and reducing the information rent that the owner-manager can extract. (7)) we obtain the upside of the investor's repayment R 2 as a monotonic function of q . Implicitly di¤erentiating (7) yields d R 2 =dq > 0: As R 2 increases, the investor extracts more from the upside and the owner-manager is left with a smaller share, so that only higher types of the owner-manager still …nd it optimal to accept the re…nancing o¤er, which pushes up q . Taken together, we can thus di¤erentiate the investor's pro…ts (3) with respect to q to obtain the …rst-order condition
(For a more explicit derivation, including d R 2 =dq , see the proof of Proposition 1). The second term in (10) captures the bene…ts from "implementing" a higher q and, thereby, extracting a higher payo¤ from all types q > q . The respective loss in surplus, given that the underinvestment problem becomes more severe, is captured by the …rst term in (10).
Discussion If the incumbent investor makes the re…nancing o¤er, as an expression of his bargaining power, the outcome can be ine¢ cient, as there may be underinvestment. The investor's o¤er then trades o¤ joint surplus maximization with information rent extraction. This rent for the owner-manager arises as she is privately informed about the …rm's pro…tability . As discussed above, this can capture the notion that re…nancing must be raised at su¢ ciently short notice.
Note that while we restrict the investor to making a single o¤er, R 2 , this is without loss of generality, as it is straightforward to show that the investor would not gain from o¤ering a menu of securities. Intuitively, any non-degenerate menu of contracts would have to include also a ‡atter security, which the owner-manager would choose for lower values q, thereby realizing more instead of less information rent.
As we noted above, the fact that the owner-manager's pro…t without re…nancing also depends on the type q ("type-dependent outside option") may even allow the investor to extract all surplus. This leaves the owner-manager with zero information rent, making the re…nancing decision under the investor's optimal o¤er R 2 is explored next, as we solve for the initial stage t = 1.
Raising Initial Finance (Strong Investor)
Initially, at t = 1, there is no private information, and …nancing can be raised at competitive terms. We model this by granting the owner-manager the right to make the o¤er to
subject to the participation constraint of the investor at t = 1
where, importantly, q and R 2 are determined at the interim stage. Note that, to simplify the exposition, we have presently assumed that, for given R 1 , the investor chooses a pure strategy in t = 2, so that R 2 and q are pinned down uniquely. As we show in the proof of Proposition 2, in analogy to a tie-breaking condition, this must indeed hold in equilibrium, even though once we arrive at t = 2, the investor's program may not be strictly quasiconcave.
Suppose …rst that there is ine¢ ciency at the interim stage irrespective of the security contract that was o¤ered initially. Below we present a simple condition when this is the case.
Proposition 2 Take the case with a strong investor who determines the re…nancing terms at t = 2. Then, if there is underinvestment at t = 2 (q > q F B ), it is uniquely optimal for the …rm to raise initial …nancing at t = 1 through a debt contract,
Debt is the ‡attest security from the investor's perspective and thus the steepest security from the owner-manager's perspective. Recall that if there is ine¢ ciency at t = 2 (cf.
the …rst-order condition (10)), it is due to the fact that the investor wants to extract more of the owner-manager's information rent. If the initial claim R 1 becomes ‡atter, the ownermanager's residual claim and thus also her expected payo¤ without …nancing (her "outside option") become steeper in q. This reduces her information rent,
for all q > q , where we know from Proposition 1 that R 2 is levered equity. As the ownermanager's information rent is reduced, it has less weight in the maximization problem of the investor at t = 2. Therefore, he resolves the trade-o¤ between rent extraction and e¢ ciency by making a re…nancing o¤er that leads to a lower, more e¢ cient q . Put differently, raising the initial amount K 1 through debt …nancing preserves the …rm's upside potential -its "equity capacity" -for the latter round of …nancing. The potential to replace the initial security by a relatively steeper ("levered equity") security allows then to reduce underinvestment.
What matters is thus how steep the new security in case of re…nancing, R 2 , can become relative to the initial security R 1 . It is through this channel that the initial …nancing decision a¤ects e¢ ciency at the re…nancing stage. Even though initial …nancing is chosen under symmetric information (and absent any other agency problem, for that matter), Proposition 2 still pins down a unique security. Debt preserves the maximum "equity capacity" to alleviate the underinvestment problem in t = 2.
Observe now from condition (9) that an e¢ cient outcome in t = 2 is feasible only if R 1 l is su¢ ciently high. Only then can the new security R 2 = b R be made su¢ ciently steep relative to R 1 . Denote the maximum feasible joint surplus, after subtraction of the initial outlay K 1 , by
and, to ease notation for the rest of the paper, let
We derive now a simple condition showing when it is feasible to construct an initial security that leads the investor to implement the e¢ cient cuto¤ q = q F B and when, instead, it holds at t = 2 that q > q F B .
Proposition 3 If a strong investor determines the re…nancing conditions in t = 2, the …rst-best investment outcome (q = q F B ) is obtained if
while otherwise there is underinvestment with q > q F B . In both cases, the security that is held by the investor after re…nancing is unambiguously steeper from the investor's perspective than the initial security ( R 2 > R 1 and R
Condition (14) is intuitive in light of the previous discussion. If x l is large enough, the owner-manager can ensure that the investor just breaks even with a security that is su¢ ciently ‡at for the investor so that, at t = 2; the "…rst-best" security is feasible. Also in this case re…nancing will lead to a strictly steeper security for the investor. However, if condition (14) holds strictly, the initial security R 1 is not pinned down uniquely. In this case there is some leeway in choosing the optimal security R 1 while still realizing the e¢ cient outcome.
Incidentally, if (14) does not hold, so that there will be underinvestment in equilibrium, the owner-manager could still o¤er an initial security that would subsequently induce …rst-best re…nancing with q = q F B , albeit then the investor would realize strictly more than what is required to make him break even. That is, the investor's ex-ante expected payment would strictly exceed his expected capital outlay. (Trivially, this would always be the case if the owner-manager no longer had a stake in the …rm as R 1 = R 2 = x.) This is, however, never optimal. Intuitively, at q = q F B a marginal distortion has a zero …rst-order e¤ect on total surplus, while a reduction in the investor's ex-ante payo¤ has a …rst-order e¤ect on the owner-manager's payo¤. 
Discussion
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 3 make the following assertions. If re…nancing is obtained from a strong investor, e.g., an investor with whom the …rm is presently "lockedin", then the claims held by outside investors should become steeper after re…nancing.
There is scope for underinvestment, especially for …rms that repay little in case of failure, relative to total pro…ts (when condition (14) does not hold). Somewhat loosely speaking, such a problem of underinvestment at the re…nancing stage should thus be expected more for …rms with a more severe downside risk. To reduce this ine¢ ciency, the …rm will initially raise …nancing through debt, thereby choosing high leverage. When re…nancing is obtained, the change in outside investors'claims reduces leverage. Precisely, for the case with underinvestment, we obtain that outside …nancing turns into levered equity at the re…nancing stage. In Section 5, after we have characterized the outcome also for the case with a weak investor, we o¤er various interpretations for these results and relate them to existing evidence on …rms'choice of …nancing.
Assumptions and Interpretation An important feature of our model, which is shared with many of the …nancial contracting models that we reviewed in the Introduction, is that the owner-manager does not raise K 1 + K 2 ex ante. This can be endogenized with the existence of an unlimited supply of fraudulent entrepreneurs who realize zero cash ‡ow regardless of how much capital is sunk. Precisely, suppose that at t = 1 there is a publicly observable, but unveri…able signal whether the entrepreneur is such a " ‡y-by-night operator" (Rajan, 1992) . Then, if the owner-manager had the unconditional right to decide on K 2 , a fraudulent owner-manager could "blackmail" outside investors by demanding a su¢ -ciently large transfer in return for paying back K 2 . Conferring the right to stop re…nancing to the investor, which is equivalent to the stipulated staging of …nancing, renders entry for such fraudulent entrepreneurs unpro…table. On the other hand, presently this feature of contracting exposes the …rm to a hold-up problem. If both securities (R 1 ; R 2 ) were speci…ed ex-ante, clearly the option to withhold re…nancing, together with the distribution of bargaining power, would still ensure that R 2 is renegotiated in the investor's interest alone (i.e., as given in Proposition 1). A renegotiation-proof contract (R 1 ; R 2 ) could be interpreted also as a (single) convertible security, which exchanges senior …nancing R 1 for junior …nancing R 2 when additional capital, K 2 , is injected.
As noted in the Introduction, the present case where the …rm is locked-in may capture various forms of relationship …nancing. We relate our results to the respective empirical evidence in Section 5. Formally, such a "lock-in" can be obtained when there is an information asymmetry between the original investor and new investors. In fact, our model could be readily extended by introducing an additional layer of information asymmetry between the owner-manager and the original investor, on one side, and new investors in t = 2, on the other side. New investors would then face a "lemons problem" when being asked to fund all or a part of K 2 . This may make access to new investors very costly or even impossible for the …rm at t = 2 (cf. Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992) .
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4 The Case with a Weak Investor
We now consider the case in which the owner-manager has all the bargaining power also at the re…nancing stage. We capture this, in analogy to the previous Section, by stipulating that she makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er R 2 . This gives rise to a game of signaling, as at t = 2 the owner-manager is privately informed about the probability of the good state, q. Recall that we motivated this with the …rm's need to raise fresh …nancing relatively quickly, so that an information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors can not be resolved in time. Again, we solve …rst for the equilibrium in the interim period, before turning to the optimal contract to raise initial …nancing at t = 1.
Re…nancing (Weak Investor)
Game of Signaling A candidate for an equilibrium of the signaling game where each "type" q plays a pure strategy is a triple of functions (R 2 (q) ; ; ): R 2 (q) is the security issued by the owner-manager of type q, where we allow for R 2 (q) = ? to capture the case where no new security is o¤ered; is the investor's posterior belief, which maps the proposed security contract into the set of probability distributions over the type set E¢ cient Re…nancing Recall that the initial security, R 1 , generates type-dependent outside options at the re…nancing stage, both for the outside investor and for the ownermanager. This makes our signaling game di¤erent from previous security design papers such as Nachman and Noe (1994) . In what follows, we show that this di¤erence drastically changes the analysis. In particular, the e¢ cient outcome may be obtained, and even though the outcome is pooling, there may not be cross-subsidization of less pro…table types q.
12 To incorporate this into our model, we suppose that the stipulated cash ‡ow realizations only apply for some "type" = h, while with positive probability the …rm may be of some "type" = l with substantially worse cash ‡ow realizations. The type is observed before the re…nancing decision, but only by "insiders" (cf. also Inderst, Münnich, and Mueller (2007) for a formalization along these lines).
Proceeding in analogy to the case with a strong investor, we …rst de…ne a security 
Hence, with b R M the investor would be indi¤erent between re…nancing the …rm and not re…nancing it for all q. More explicitly, this obtains
If such a security was accepted by the investor, it would allow the owner-manager to extract all of the surplus obtained from re…nancing. The key feature of security b R M is that it is "beliefs-free" for the investor: Regardless of the …rm's pro…tability type, the investor is indi¤erent between retaining his old claim R 1 without re…nancing and exchanging it for b R M after investing additionally K 2 . Clearly, if no such initial …nancing, R 1 , were in place, as in standard models of security design under private information, this would be feasible only if the new security were riskless debt. Then -by de…nition -the value of the security would not depend on the …rm's pro…tability. Instead, the value of b R M does depend on the …rm's type and thus on the owner-manager's private information. However, when there is initial …nancing in place, what matters is that the di¤erence between the …rm value under the new and the old security does not depend on the type.
We now argue that provided that b R M is feasible, for given R 1 , re…nancing is obtained if and only if it is e¢ cient, i.e., for all q > q F B but not for all q < q F B , and that it is indeed obtained through issuing R 2 = b R M . As a …rst step in the argument, note that the investor will accept b R M whenever it is o¤ered. To be precise, observe that by marginally increasing either b R M l or b R M , the investor's preference for accepting can be made strict.
This implies that any type q > q F B can ensure himself (arbitrarily close to) the full surplus from re…nancing, so that there can be no "cross-subsidization" among types. This also implies that there is no re…nancing for all q < q F B , as the contract rules out crosssubsidization across types. Next, note that for given q there clearly exists more then one re…nancing contract R 2 satisfying v Y (R 2 ; q) = v N (R 1 ; q), so that for this type the investor is made indi¤erent between re…nancing and not re…nancing. However, if such a contract R 2 were not equal to b R M , then by construction of b R M there would be types q 0 > q or types q < q 0 for which the aforementioned cross-subsidization would now be feasible. This is why in equilibrium re…nancing must be obtained with R 2 = b R M .
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Proposition 4 Security b R M is feasible at the re…nancing stage t = 2 if
Then, in the case with a weak investor, re…nancing is obtained when q > q F B and not obtained when q < q F B . Types q F B < q < 1 uniquely o¤er b R M , where b R M is ‡atter from the investor's perspective than the initial security
The existence of a "…rst-best" security b R M , provided that condition (17) is satis…ed, distinguishes the outcome of our game of signaling from the previous security design literature where …nancing is raised under private information. This follows from the typedependence of the outside option of the investor. In a standard model where no initial security is in place, the investor strictly prefers to …nance a higher type, so that he is willing to accept a less favorable security. This makes it strictly preferable for all types to mimic a higher type. This is no longer the case when an initial security is in place. Then, also the value of the initial security strictly increases in the …rm's pro…tability, making the investor less inclined to accept a new security in exchange for re…nancing. Under the …rst-best security b R M these two countervailing forces just balance.
Observe next that b R M must be ‡atter than R 1 : Re…nancing increases the upside probability in the good state relative to that in the bad state. To ensure that the owner-manager can extract all of the net surplus for all q, the new contract must give the investor less from the upside and more when the low cash ‡ow is realized. Hence, if q H is the highest type (in a pool) issuing R 2 , he will extract strictly less than "his surplus". A key insight that is shared with much of the literature on security design with adverse selection (see, in particular, Nachman and Noe, 1994) is that the degree of such "cross-subsidization" is lowest when, in a given pool, the respective security is debt.
Equilibrium Security When Re…nancing is Ine¢ cient
Intuitively, the di¤erence v Y (R 2 ; q) v N (R 1 ; q), which is strictly increasing in q, becomes ‡atter if debt is issued, as debt is least "information-sensitive" to the private information q.
Following this literature (e.g., Nachman and Noe, 1994; DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999; or DeMarzo et al., 2005) , we now apply criterion D1 to re…ne the out-of-equilibrium beliefs (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Ramey, 1996) . Roughly speaking, if type q 0 has a weak incentive to deviate to some security e R 2 , while type q has a strict incentive, then the investor should put probability zero on type q 0 making this deviation. (A formal de…nition is contained in the proof of the subsequent proposition.) Then, in equilibrium all type must o¤er a (pooling) debt contract as, otherwise, the highest type in a pool would credibly deviate by o¤ering a ‡atter re…nancing contract to the investor.
Proposition 5 Take the case with a weak investor at t = 2, where we apply the re…nement D1 for the resulting game of signaling. Suppose condition (17) does not hold, so that b R M is not feasible and there will be cross-subsidization in case of re…nancing. Then, in any re…ned equilibrium there is a cuto¤ q M so that all types q < q M do not re…nance while all types q > q M re…nance. Re…nancing is obtained for allM through the same debt contract R 2 (i.e., R Proof. See Appendix.
Note that Proposition 4 and 5 joint imply that the re…nancing security is now always ‡atter than the original security R 1 , irrespective of whether there is cross-subsidization or not. De…ne next for given initial security R 1 a pooling debt security R 2 = R P for which the investor is just indi¤erent to re…nancing: R P = x l ; R P and q M jointly satisfy
Note that q M < q F B , as there is cross-subsidization of lower types under re…nancing.
Hence, there is overinvestment at the re…nancing stage. The outcome where allM pool at this particular (break-even) debt contract can be supported by beliefs that satisfy the imposed re…nement D1. However, D1 does not eliminate other pooling equilibria with debt where the investor is left with a strictly positive "rent" under re…nancing: D1 uniquely pins down the shape of the re…nancing security, but not the level. In what follows, we now impose the common restriction that the investor just breaks even, so that the equilibrium at t = 2 is uniquely pinned down by (18), provided that condition (17) does not hold. 
Raising Initial Finance (Weak Investor)
Recall that at t = 1 there is no private information and …nancing can be raised at competitive terms. The owner-manager thus maximizes
subject to the ex ante participation constraints of the investor
where q M and R 2 = R P are determined either from (18), when (17) does not hold, or from (17) holds. Suppose …rst that there is ine¢ ciency at the 14 In fact, it can be shown that this is also the unique equilibrium outcome if there is competition by outside investors at t = 2. Precisely, suppose there are at least two new outside investors who could o¤er to re…nance K 2 and, at the same time, to buy out the incumbent investor. To preserve the bargaining power of the owner-manager, assume that the owner-manager must agree …rst to such a proposal, before it is passed on to the incumbent investor. Then, R P is the unique outcome in this game of competition.
re…nancing stage. We present below a simple condition when this is the case in equilibrium and show that then (19) binds. The owner-manager is the residual claimant in t = 1. His aim is thus to maximize the expected surplus at t = 1. That is, the security she o¤ers in the initial period should be designed so that the gap between the cuto¤s q M and q F B is minimal.
Proposition 6 Suppose there is overinvestment at the re…nancing stage. Then, it is uniquely optimal for the …rm to raise initial …nancing through a levered equity contract,
Levered equity is the steepest security from the investor's perspective and thus the ‡attest security from the owner-manager's perspective. Recall that, presently, with a weak investor the ine¢ ciency at t = 2 is caused by overinvestment, as also types [q M ; q F B ) receive re…nancing under the pooling (debt) contract. Raising the initial amount K 1 through levered equity …nancing preserves the …rm's "debt capacity". That is, the re…nancing security R 2 can then be made ‡atter relative to the initial security R 1 . This limits crosssubsidization and thus improves e¢ ciency by pushing up the marginal type q M .
Recall now that when the …rst-best investment is feasible at t = 2, so that the cuto¤ satis…es q M = q F B , the "…rst-best security" R 2 = b R M is ‡atter than R 1 . Proposition 7 derives a condition when e¢ ciency is feasible. We have thus arrived at the following result.
Proposition 7 Take the case with a weak investor at t = 2. Then, the …rst-best re…nanc-ing outcome (q M = q F B ) is obtained when
while otherwise there is overinvestment with q M < q F B . In either case, the security that is held by outside investors after re…nancing at t = 2 is unambiguously ‡atter from the investor's perspective than the initial security ( R 2 < R 1 and R
The intuition for condition (20) is straightforward given the previous discussion and condition (17) , which showed when b R M is feasible for given R 1 . If x l is large enough, the owner-manager can ensure that the investor just breaks even while at the same time making R 1 su¢ ciently steep, so that subsequently the "…rst-best" security b R M is feasible at t = 2. When condition (20) holds strictly, there is again some leeway to choose the initial security R 1 , while still ensuring that subsequent …nancing is raised e¢ ciently. Still, for any optimal choice R 1 , re…nancing will lead to a strictly ‡atter security for the investor:
He will receive less from the upside, but he is more protected on the downside.
Implications and Evidence
We argued in Section 3 that the strong-investor case may better describe situations in which the …rm enters into a relationship with an investor. We also discussed how the characterized securities (R 1 ; R 2 ) could then describe a sequence of renegotiation-proof contracts. In Section 4, we considered the polar case in which it is the owner-manager who has full bargaining power at the re…nancing stage. One interpretation that we o¤ered so far is that this represents a competitive market for …nancing also at t = 2, as the incumbent investor has no privileged information. Alternatively, the owner-manager's bargaining power at t = 2 could come from her threat to withhold essential human capital that is needed to grow the business (cf. Hart and Moore, 1994) . Hence, the weak-investor case may also describe the …nancing of …rms that depend heavily on human capital provided by insiders. Outside investors may have low bargaining power also in countries with weak protection of their rights or with weak legal enforcement of these rights. We explore the respective interpretations in more detail in what follows, deriving various implications from our model of …nancial contracting.
Our stylized model of a …rm's dynamic contracting problem obtains implications both for a …rm's choice of …nancing under asymmetric information and for its change of leverage over time. The respective results in Propositions 3 and 7 imply that the change in leverage depends crucially on whether the …rm has access to competitive …nancing also when it must raise …nancing under asymmetric information (at short notice) or whether it is then locked into a relationship with an incumbent outside investor.
Start-Up Financing and Young Firm Financing
A suitable environment to test the contrasting predictions is the …nancing of young …rms with growth potential. In this case, as noted above, we can take the two-stage nature of our model literally. Initially, when marketing her idea, we stipulate that the owner-manager can bridge any information asymmetry vis-à-vis outside investors. 15 At a later stage, however, when fresh …nancing has to be raised, probably at short notice, the information gap with outside investors may have widened as only the owner-manager is involved in the …rm's day-to-day operations. Also, there may then be insu¢ cient time to credibly divulge all relevant information to investors. We now argue that the contrasting implications of our model are particularly suitable to match the rich evidence from the recent literature on start-up and young …rm …nancing.
Following the empirical contributions of Gompers (1995) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) , several theoretical papers have tried to explain why venture capitalists provide funds in exchange for senior securities with the option of converting them into junior ones (e.g., Berglöf, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Hellmann, 2006) . Our results for the strong-investor case are consistent with this observation (cf. our previous interpretations in terms of convertible securities), albeit in contrast to the extant theoretical literature our characterization focuses on the distribution of cash ‡ows rather than the contingent allocation of control rights. Our model also has richer implications as these convertible securities do not always arise in equilibrium. The resulting contrasting implications allow us to organize the richer …ndings in the recent empirical literature. This literature has taken a more di¤erentiated view, showing that convertible debt and preferred equity are less common in start-up …nance under di¤erent legal environments (Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming 2008; Kaplan et al., 2007) . Lerner and Schoar (2005) have shown that while private equity …rms in countries with common law or strong legal enforcement often use convertible preferred stock, common stock is the favored instrument in weak enforcement and civil law countries. This is consistent with our results, as we predict a switch from senior to junior …nancing when the investor is strong in t = 2 and the opposite when the investor is weak. Also Kaplan et al. (2007) …nd that in countries with weaker creditor rights equity is more frequently issued in …rst rounds. Further, the more successful (and thus possibly stronger) …rms that have issued equity in earlier rounds switch to more senior securities in later rounds.
16 Hellmann et al. (2008) analyze banks' private equity investments in start-up …rms.
They …nd that banks direct their equity investments towards later stages of the development of start-ups. The same banks are then signi…cantly more likely to subsequently grant a loan (i.e. debt …nancing) to these …rms. This …nding, which is con…rmed by Fang et al. (2010), is in line with our predictions when we apply the following reasoning. In contrast to specialized venture capitalists, banks may lack speci…c industry knowledge as well as the management skills that are required, in particular, at the early stage. One may thus presume that …rms obtaining risk capital from banks may be less likely to …nd themselves locked-in in the future. This translates to our weak-investor case, for which the prediction of a shift from equity to debt …nancing is in line with the aforementioned empirical observations.
Long-Term vs. Short-Term Financial Strategy
As noted in the Introduction, though our stylized model has only two periods, we interpret our results also in terms of a …rm's long-term and short-term …nancial strategy. Our motivation for this is as follows. We stipulate that information asymmetry should be more relevant when …nancing is needed at short notice, e.g., to realize an investment opportunity that is open only for a short time. Instead, when a …rm chooses its longterm (or target) …nancial structure, this choice should be plagued less by information asymmetry. The …rm should then have time to credibly bridge or at least signi…cantly narrow an informational gap vis-à-vis outside investors. These two choices correspond to the security design problems in t = 2 and t = 1 of our model. In particular, the security that is held by outside investors after re…nancing in t = 2 may represent a …rm's temporary deviation from its long-term …nancial strategy.
When we take this perspective, an application of our weak-investor case yields the following implications. Large …rms with access to capital markets may choose "armslength"
…nancing as a long-term capital strategy, so that even in t = 2 of our model they will face a competitive …nancial market (albeit one plagued by information asymmetry). Fama 16 Kaplan et al. (2007) interpret this as a sign of learning that US-style contracts are more e¢ cient.
and French (2005) …nd that equity issuance is often observed in companies that are not under duress. They interpret this as a violation of Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order theory (cf. also Leary and Roberts, 2010) . Our model shows that this allows …rms to preserve their "debt capacity" (cf. Lemmon and Zender, 2009 ), and we predict that, in line with the pecking order, debt …nancing will be chosen if …nancing is needed at short notice. Put di¤erently, …rms that expect to have continuing access to a competitive …nancial market should use equity issuances to bring their …nancing in line with their target capital structure, while short-term deviations are observed jointly with fresh debt …nancing.
We obtain strikingly di¤erent predictions for …rms that raise …nancing from (relationship) investors who hold bargaining power in the future, when additional …nancing is needed at relatively short notice. These …rms should choose high leverage as their target capital structure, which preserves "equity capacity". Deviations from their long-term capital structure should thus involve the issuance of equity rather than debt (or, likewise, the conversion of outstanding securities into more junior claims). Interestingly, for these …rms debt would thus represent the preferred source of …nancing when information asymmetries are not an issue, which is in line with the survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001) .
It is further the predominant choice for small …rms that often obtain loans from a single bank with which they have close ties (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Detragiache et al. 2000) .
The …ndings of Leary and Roberts (2010) and Gomes and Phillips (2005) suggest that smaller growth …rms will indeed issue debt when asymmetric information is not a factor, so as to preserve "equity capacity" for the long run.
Conclusion
We develop a dynamic theory of a …rm's security design and optimal capital structure.
The key linkage between the …rm's choice of initial …nancing, which is raised "for the long-term" under symmetric information, and its subsequent …nancing under asymmetric information is that the former a¤ects the "outside options" for both insiders and outside investors when new …nancing must be raised. We …nd that the model's implications for the optimal …nancial structure and it's change over time di¤er sharply depending on whether the bargaining power at the re…nancing stage lies (more) with the …rm, as it faces a competitive capital market, or with initial investors.
If incumbent investors have bargaining power at the re…nancing stage, ine¢ ciency in the form of underinvestment may arise, as they attempt to extract higher "rents" from better informed insiders (the "owner-manager" in our model). Instead, a problem of overinvestment is likely if bargaining power lies with the better informed insiders.
If initial investors have bargaining power when …nancing is needed in the future, the …rm will raise additional …nancing through reducing leverage. Intuitively, in this case a …rm's long-term (target) capital structure preserves "equity capacity", as this reduces underinvestment in the future. In contrast, if bargaining power is in the hands of the …rm also when future …nancing is needed, then the initial (or long-term) leverage decision serves to reduce the subsequent overinvestment problem: The …rm preserves its "debt capacity", as it seeks re…nancing through issuing debt in the future.
We show that our richer implications, in contrast to most standard theories of security design under asymmetric information, are largely in line with the sometimes contrasting recent evidence in the literature. Our polar cases with strong or weak investors may shed light on cross-country di¤erences in start-up and young …rm …nancing, as well as di¤erences between early-and later-stage …nancing. We also related our results to a …rm's choice of target …nancial structure vis-à-vis temporary deviations that are due to its need to raise …nancing at short term under problems of asymmetric information. Admittedly, these implications are somewhat tentative as our model is highly stylized, allowing only for two periods. Hence, this perspective could be explored further in a model with an open time horizon. Further, though we showed how our restriction on the amount of …nancing that is raised initially (or, for that matter, for the long term) can be endogenized, a …rm may hold free cash as part of its optimal …nancial strategy when the agency problems that this engenders are not too large.
Appendix A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from a sequence of auxiliary results.
Claim 1. The …rst-best security b R is feasible if and only if condition (9) holds.
Proof. Note …rst that if the initial security R 1 is feasible, then from x R 1 0 and from the construction of b R in (5) we also have that x b R 0. Further, as condition
To see next that b R l x l holds, we substitute (5) into (6) and obtain
This implies from (1) that b R l < R 1 l and thus also b R l < x l , given that R 1 was feasible. The remaining condition is thus that b R l 0, which from (A.1) is just condition (9). From this it also follows that (9) is necessary for b R to be feasible. Q.E.D.
The next claim establishes that by optimality of R 2 ; the set of owner-manager types that accepts, q 2 A, is always characterized by a cuto¤ q . We argue to a contradiction, showing that if there existed a security R 2 so that the owner-manager would prefer acceptance for low but not for high q, then the …rst-best contract b R would be feasible, instead. Then, as argued in the main text, it is clearly optimal to o¤er b R.
is feasible, then also the …rst-best security b R is feasible.
Proof. Note …rst that from the assumed inequalities u Y (R 2 ; 0) > u N (R 1 ; 0) (ownermanager prefers re…nancing for q = 0) and u N (R 1 ; 1) > u Y ( b R 2 ; 1) (owner-manager prefers no-re…nancing for q = 1), b R < R 2 must hold to ensure that the slope of u Y (R 2 ; q) is
By the assumed feasibility of R 2 , we have from this that b R l > 0, so that (9) holds strictly.
Q.E.D.
From Claims 1-2 re…nancing takes place whenever(with q = q F B if b R is feasible). It is straightforward to rule out optimality of the case q = 1 (zero probability of re…nancing). If q < 1, then the cuto¤ is pinned down by the requirement that u Y (R 2 ; q ) = u N (R 1 ; q ) (cf. also (7)).
Claim 3. Levered-equity with R 2 l = 0 is the uniquely optimal security for the investor if the …rst-best security b R is not feasible.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction. Suppose that, so as to implement some q 2 [0; 1], another security R 2 with R 2 l > 0 were optimal. Choose now e R 2 = (0; e R 2 ) so that
, which implies that the owner-manager's acceptance set, [q ; 1], remains unchanged, while at q the investor's conditional expected payo¤ does not change:
Thus, provided it is feasible, the investor is indeed strictly better o¤ under the newly
It remains to show that e R 2 is indeed feasible. By the assumed feasibility of R 2 and construction of e R 2 , this is the case if e R 2 x. (The other feasibility restrictions on e R 2 are satis…ed by feasibility of
so that e R 2 x holds whenever
However, (A.2) is implied by the assumption that the …rst-best security is not feasible, i.e., that (9) does not hold. To see this, note …rst that from the de…nition of q , i.e.
As, by assumption, b R is not feasible, it holds from transforming the "…rst-best condition" (9) that
where the last inequality holds for any q . But this is just what we needed to show (condition (A.3) ). Q.E.D.
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1, we solve the investor's program when b R is not feasible. For this observe that from the indi¤erence condition of the owner-manager at q ,
, we have that
; (A.4) from which we obtain explicitly
where the inequality follows as R 2 l = 0 when (9) does not hold. We can next substitute for the acceptance set A = [q ; 1] into the investor's objective function (3), where q is given by the indi¤erence condition for the owner-manager (cf.
condition (7)). Di¤erentiating with respect to q , we have the …rst-order condition (cf.
also (10))
where the …rst term follows from s d (q) = u d (R t ; q) + v d (R t ; q) and (7). As
while s Y (q ) s N (q ) is strictly increasing and equal to zero when q = q F B , we have that
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that R 1 with R 1 l < x l were optimal and that there is ine¢ ciency at t = 2. By Proposition 1 the investor chooses a security R 2 = (0; R 2 ) that implements a cuto¤ q old > q F B . Note that we relegate to the end of the proof the argument why, in the equilibrium of the whole game, the investor must always choose the most e¢ cient cuto¤ from his optimal correspondence and thus plays a pure strategy. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. We start by constructing e R 1 = (x l ; e R 1 ) together with e R 2 = (0; e R 2 ) so that two conditions are satis…ed: The owner-manager is still indi¤erent at his old cuto¤ q old and, holding this cuto¤ …xed, the ex ante payo¤ for both parties stays the same. By construction, it then holds that
together with u Y (R 2 ; q old ) = u N (R 1 ; q old ) and u Y ( e R 2 ; q old ) = u N ( e R 1 ; q old ). To ease exposition, let
:
be de…ned as in (13) in the main text. Recall also that, for given q and R 1 , R 2 is given in (A.4). Plugging into (A.6) we have
from which we can express e R 1 as
Step 2. We now show that, if o¤ered e R 1 in the initial period, the investor will actually o¤er a di¤erent security R 2 6 = e R 2 at t = 2 that implements a strictly lower cuto¤. For this purpose we look at the expected payo¤ of the investor at t = 2 when he is faced with R 1 or e R 1 , respectively, and then apply monotone comparative statics.
As the second security is levered equity with R 2 l = e R 2 l = 0, the indi¤erence condition of the owner-manager at a cuto¤ q gives the respective value R 2 as a unique function of R 1 and q only (cf. (A.4) ). We use R 2 (q ; R 1 ) and R 2 (q ; e R 1 ), making thereby explicit that R 2 ( ) presently denotes a function. Next, we de…ne the investor's expected payo¤ at t = 2 for some q and an initial contract R 1 by
De…ning V (q ; e R 1 ) accordingly, we now show that the di¤erence V (q ; e R 1 ) V (q ; R 1 ) is decreasing in q . (Importantly, note that q is not an optimal selection from the investor's optimization problem at this point.) After some transformations we have
Next, using (A.5) and (A.7), we obtain an explicit expression for the second term under the integral in (A.9). Importantly, observe that e R 1 is de…ned as a function of q old and not
where for the …rst inequality we use that p N (q old ) =b p N > 1, and for the second inequality we use that b p N > p N B . From (A.9), it follows, therefore, that
Thus, the di¤erence V (q ; e R 1 ) V (q ; R 1 ) decreases in q . By standard monotone selection arguments, strictly decreasing di¤erences imply the following: Any optimal cuto¤ q new that the investor chooses given e R 1 is lower than any optimal cuto¤ q old that he selects given R 1 , so that q new < q old .
Step 3. In this step we show that the owner-manager is indeed better o¤ with the considered deviation. Observe …rst that by construction both the owner-manager and the investor are ex ante indi¤erent between (R 1 ; R 2 ) and ( e R 1 ; e R 2 ), when holding q = q old constant. But as q new < q old , it follows from (A. satis…es the investor's break-even condition. Taken together, this contradicts the optimality of R 1 .
To conclude the proof, we can make use of the preceding results to show that, as asserted in the main text, in equilibrium the investor chooses a pure strategy and, thereby, implements the most e¢ cient (i.e., lowest) q in case his optimal contractual choice at t = 2 is not uniquely determined. Given a debt security at t = 1, one can use the indi¤er-ence condition (7) to express the second-stage levered equity security R 2 as a function of R 1 and q . We can thus write V (q ; R 1 ) instead of V (q ; R 1 ) (cf. expression (A.8)).
Further, we use Q = arg max V (q ; R 1 ) to denote the optimal choice correspondence subject to (12). Observe now that given R 1 , V (q ; R 1 ) is strictly submodular in q and
Therefore, again by monotonic selection arguments, relaxing the investor's ex ante participation constraint by increasing R 1 results in a lower set Q . Since Q is monotonic, it must be almost everywhere a singleton and continuous. Then, while the investor's payo¤ is continuous in R 1 everywhere, the owner-manager's expected payo¤ is continuous a.e. and, where Q is not a singleton, the owner-manager strictly prefers the lowest (most e¢ cient) value q = min Q . Consequently, analogously to a tie-breaking condition, by optimality for the owner-manager the investor must choose q = min Q with probability one in equilibrium. Q.E.D. A …rst-period security that satis…es (A.10) is feasible if
where the last inequality is just condition (9) from Proposition 1. These three conditions can be rewritten as follows:
Since the left-hand side must be greater than the right-hand side, it must be that
Simple transformations yield condition (14). If (14) holds, by optimality for the ownermanager we then have that q = q F B : The optimal security R 1 then maximizes joint surplus and, by making the investor just break even, achieves the maximum feasible payo¤ for the owner-manager.
We …nally formalize the argument from the main text that in equilibrium q > q F B
if (14) does not hold. That is, though …rst-best e¢ ciency could be achieved by granting the investor a su¢ ciently large payo¤, this is not optimal. Using the optimality of debt, consider the owner-manager's optimal choice of R 1 . Di¤erentiating her expected pro…ts with respect to R 1 yields at points of di¤erentiability of q ( R 1 ) We now de…ne more formally the re…nement D1. 17 Let U ( e R 2 ; q; ) be the expected payo¤ of the owner-manager when o¤ering a security e R 2 U ( e R 2 ; q; ) := u Y ( e R 2 ; q) + (1 ) u N R 1 ; q :
For each type q, determine the minimum probability of acceptance, (qj e R 2 ), that would make o¤ering e R 2 weakly attractive (qj e R 2 ) = minf : U ( e R 2 ; q; ) U (q)g;
where U (q) denotes the equilibrium payo¤ of type q. Then, provided that this leads to a non-empty set, D1 restricts the support of the investor's beliefs to those types that would …nd e R 2 attractive for the lowest probability of acceptance Q dev ( e R 2 ) = q 2 [0; 1] j (qj e R 2 ) = min
Claim 3. In an equilibrium satisfying D1, all types that obtain re…nancing o¤er the same debt security.
Proof. This follows standard arguments (cf. Nachman and Noe, 1994) , so we omit the formal details of the proof for the sake of brevity. We showed that when the …rst best is not feasible, as (17) does not hold, then the highest type issuing a certain security, i.e., the highest type in the respective "pool", never extracts the full surplus. This type would thus strictly bene…t from "separating away" from the pool. Given that higher types strictly prefer to share cash ‡ow for the (less likely) low realization, this is possible under D1, provided that the initial security was not debt. Clearly, it is not incentive compatible to have more than one debt security in equilibrium. Finally, pooling with debt for all types who receive re…nancing can be supported by beliefs that satisfy D1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose …rst that the investor just breaks even ex-ante, so that 
Taking the total derivative of (A.12) allows us, therefore, to examine how a change in R 1 l a¤ects the equilibrium cuto¤ q M at the interim stage, given that R 1 and R 2 adjust so that the investor has the same ex ante expected payo¤ under the old and the new equilibrium.
x l R 1 l 0;
where the last condition is just (17) from Proposition 4. These conditions can be rewritten
where we have already used that x l < K 1 . One can construct a feasible security R 1 only if the right-hand side in the …rst line is greater than the right-hand side in the second line.
Note now that from x l < K 1 the …rst term on the right-hand side of (A.14) is the smallest.
We then have the requirement
which after some transformations becomes condition (20) in the main text. Q.E.D.
